I have no quarrel with the financial access argument, and there is no doubt that millions of women across the developing world have had the opportunity to better their circumstances in the short run. My concern is about the long-term effects. I will argue that micro-credit may lead to long-term depletion of household assets, and that there is a potential for impoverishment as opposed to poverty alleviation.
The incredible thing about micro-credit is that the default rates are ridiculously low, The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, famously reported a default rate of 1%. This means the groups returned the money (with interest) 99% of the time. This is a higher repayment rate than most commercial banks could ever dream of. Credit card companies would sell whatever they have left of a soul for such figures. The question of course is why does the money come back? The answer lies in the concept of group liability, and the fact that the group will not recieve a further loan until the first is repaid. What is very convenient is that all the monitoring is done by the groups themselves.
In order for an individual borrower to truly benefit from the loan it is necessary that she utilise the loan for a productive purpose, which generates a return of over 24%. Firstly several studies suggest that a large number of these loans are used for consumption rather than productive purposes. Secondly a return of 24% or over is a reasonably high rate of return. Venture Capitalists for instance expect an average return of about 25-30% on businesses. Only a fairly small subset of businesses achieve this rate of return. To return to the subject at hand, in cases where the loans are being used to smoothen consumption, or for business ventures which yield a less than 24% return, borrowers are actually economically worse off than before they took the loan. If this cycle repeats multiple times, we would see long term asset depletion. There is evidence to suggest that this happening in a disturbingly large number of cases.
Of course there are those cases where the picture is much brighter, in fact just the kind of picture we’d like to frame and put up in our hallway, especially if our organisation is trying to attract funds from some well-intentioned foreign agency. And these are the pictures we’d like to cling to. The cases where the borrowers are successful micro-entrepreneurs and have a business which yields enough to beat the 24% red line. Now micro-credit works much like any other form of credit, where you get rewarded for good behavior, and regular repayment allows you to get a larger loan the next time around. The problem is that most micro-enterprises aren’t scalable, and begin to exhibit decresing returns to scale quite early on. This means that with every additional investment in the business, the returns go up by a smaller and smaller amount, until finally there is a point at which investing more might actually yield less than the amount of the investment. We aren’t really concerned about that stage, our tipping point is the stage at which the yield dips below 24%. The truth is that most large businesses cannot predict when this will happen despite some of them paying management consultancy fees larger than the total amount of money disbursed by micro-finance banks across an entire state. For a village entrepreneur this is very very hard to foresee. Also the temptation to borrow a larger sum of money may overshadow the fact that returns are decreasing. So although many may pull themselves out of poverty through this medium, there are a large number who may never make it past, and those who do, may be undone by over-investment.
The next argument is a little more technical, but if you have suffered the author thus far, I would encourge you to delve in.
Credit is a somewhat strange commodity, with most goods, you pay for them before you consume them. With credit unlike with junk food, you can actually develop indigestion before you pay your bill. You use credit today and pay for it tomorrow. Actually in that it does have something in common with junk food. The interest paid is the price we pay for the benefit of being to be able to consume something we cannot yet afford. Now when we borrow money in order to invest it in a venture, we borrow on the basis of expected return, because there is always some amount of risk involved with any venture, or some chance that the venture will fail. Our ability to make wise investment decisions depends upon our ability to evaluate risk. A pertinent question to ask is how competent the average micro-entrepreneur is in perceiving and correctly evaluating risk.
There is another aspect to this decision-making process. Due to the fact that we derive the benefit from borrowing immediately, and pay for it later, our decision on whether to take the loan hinges on how we value the future vis a vis the present. Our appetite for instant gratification at the cost of future regret explains a large part of the sub-prime crisis, as well as a large number of marriages. In the case of a village woman, putting food on the table today is more important than the potentially crippling interest repayment that is to be made at the end of the month. This trade-off between present and future is determined by what is called the individuals discount rate, or tha rate at which she discounts the future. My assertion is that in many cases it may be rational for a micro-borrower to take a larger loan than she will be able to repay. Remember that the screening process is fairly basic, and conducted by peers who may be similarly predisposed.
The final factor which affects the investment choice of an investor is their attitude to risk. Individuals can be divided into three basic groups depending on their attitude to risk. Or to be more acurate there are three types of behavior based on response to risk, because the same person may display different risk behavior in different situations. For the sake of simplicity let’s assume that people always behave true to type.
1. Risk Averse
2. Risk Neutral
3. Risk Loving
Imagine you were given a choice between receiving Rs 100 or the ticket to a lottery where you had a 50% chance of winning Rs 200 and a 50% chance of geting nothing. Now for someone who is risk neutral the two choices are equivalent, she would be indifferent between the two. A risk averse individual would always choose the certainty of Rs 100, and a risk loving individual would always take the chance of the lottery. The reason that these categories are important is because risk behavior can have a profound effect on how the poor make investment decisions. We usually assume that borrowers are risk averse, which means that they always choose the option that involves the least risk. However I would argue that in fact the poor may be inclined to take high risks in order to improve their current situation, and in certain cases display risk loving behavior.
My contention is that a combination of a high discount rate, and a high preference for risk, would result in high rates of failure of micro-enterprises, and thereby a tendency for micro-borrowers to end up worse off as a result of taking the loan.
To sum up, a large proportion of micro-loans are used for consumption purposes, and in these cases the 24% interest payment leaves the borrower poorer. In cases where the the loan is used productively, many micro-enterprises may not achieve a higher than 24% profit margin, leading to a smaller but significant drain on the household. And of the cases where that margin is realised, lack of scalability could result in stagnation before the household is able to break out of the poverty trap. In addition I have outlined behavioral characteristics which induce micro-entrepreneurs to take potentially harmful risks with their borrowings.
I realise that this could be viewed as an alarmist perspective, but my intention is not to dismiss micro-credit as an evil institution. I believe that Dr. Muhammad Yunus’s innovation has changed the lives of millions for the better. However it is unwise to ignore the potential hazards of indiscriminate lending, and also perhaps premature to conclude that micro-finance will inevitably result in wide-spread poverty alleviation, and economic development. I suggest that there is scope for improving the mechanism and a need for redesign.
There has been a lot of debate about the exaggerated impact of micro credit… but yet it has managed to be successful in specific examples. I agree that this may not be enough… plus it has taken years.. if not deacdes for these examples to be worth talking about. So my question would then be… what next? How does one take a decent idea and implement it so that it does reach the poorest of the poor and achieve its desired effect? And what role would the state have in this v the private sector? Id be interested to know how you'd redesign the mechanism..
p.s. have spent some time with womens group ina village in tamil nadu… and you're absolutely right… it is just on example.. but the women do tend to use their loans more for immediate consumption!
So another question… and a much bigger one… how do you educate?
Nik,
Your post is thought-provoking. I have a couple of questions and comments.
First of all, I had no idea microfinance involved such a high interest rate…24%??!!! that's insanely high!! (Incidentially, you've said that equates to Rs 2 per 100…but isn't that 2%? Do you mean Rs 20 per 100?)
I recently attended a lecture by Yunus at Emory…it was a nice talk expounding the concept of social entrepreneurship but as is expected from a public lecture, he oversimplified the facts and presented the glorious rosy picture and in the end it left me all confused as to how this concept really works…so how does it? What happens if the borrowers can't repay the money? As you said, do they keep sinking deeper and deeper in debt? Why don't we hear those stories if microfinance is such a huge success it's made out to be?
From what I understand, are you saying that microfinance can only help to alleviate poverty to only a certain extent and at some point of time, the prohibitive nature of the interest rates will prevent these "semi-alleviated" population from borrowing larger sums of money? So where do they turn to?
Lastly, in para 5, you state that "there is evidence to suggest that this happening in a disturbingly large number of cases.". Do send me a link or two to support this if you can…I'm curious!
Incidentally, see this excellent documentary made my PBS – http://video.pbs.org/video/1479100777. I think you'll find it interesting…one of the points you bring up about risk-loving people is presented here to demonstrate the concept of an economic bubble.
Keep 'em coming in champ 🙂
Love
Kanika
@Kanika,
Quick response, the interest rate is 2 per hundred per month, which works out to 2×12=24 per year. The argument is that micro-businesses have large margins, 100 – 300%, but as they scale up the margins shrink.
Yes there is a gap, between micro-credit and institutional credit from banks and such-like, but there again the fact is that before micro-credit, there was no access to finance for the poor at all, so it's a start.
Some of this evidence is from a study I conducted in 2006 with women across 6 districts in Andhra Pradesh(unpublished). Other peope have come to a similar conclusion http://knowledge.allianz.com/en/globalissues/microfinance/microcredit/microfinance_debt_trap.html.
The problem is that there have not been too many long-term studies which try to assess the economic impact of micro-credit, but there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that a large number of borrowers are recycling loans by paying off interest from fresh loans.
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/microcredit-used-get-out-debt
One assumption that you make in concluding that 24% interest rate charged is an unrealistic expectation of a rate of return for micro-enterprises is that this is all based on growth of the enterprise. There are a number of seasonal businesses, which use the loans to smooth revenues and costs. Tent house stores for example are in higher demand around marriage season. What this would mean then is that the enterprise doesn't need to grow 24%, but rather need to have greater than 24% profit margin for these loans to be beneficial. In that case, microfinance can and does contribute to wealth.
That said, I agree with you that there's a serious glut in the sector of loans and a lack of a transparent regulatory body to monitor the number of loans that women have and what they're being used for. The use of new loans to repay old loans is not a concept unique to microfinance. It's just beginning to manifest itself as the industry develops and matures, which just means that regulatory bodies will need to be established. The Reserve Bank of India just established the Microfinance Institutions Network: http://tinyurl.com/37yoz5m as a self-regulatory body. But what they really need is a central database of loan data between all MFIs like the commercial credit market.
Nikhilesh,
I've been out of the microfinance game for a while, but from a free-market perspective, I remember the old argument being that as long as providing microcredit was a profitable venture for MFIs, competition would eventually drive down the cost of borrowing. Is there any evidence that this is happening?
We must also keep in mind that MFIs are not getting rich off the interest rate they charge (they're getting rich from lucrative IPOs, but that's a discussion for another day), the interest rate in fact reflects the high cost of lending to the rural poor at their doorstep.
It may be a reach, and probably adding undue complexity to the microcredit story, but it would also be interesting to draw a parallel between the subprime crisis in the US to see what happens when credit is engineered to be cheaper than market forces would normally allow. What do you think?
I don't claim to be either a microcredit specialist or an economist so feel free to correct misperceptions!
Sara
Nikhilesh:
A few things:
1) the loan amounts are usually a few hundred USD not INR
2) the 99% repayment rates are a. usually self reported and, as such, b. subject to some "finessing" in the form of pushing back the number of days outstanding. Were MFIs to be forced to report audited 60 days portfolio at risk the default rates would likely fall in line with other forms of credit.
3) Have you read Duflo and Glennester's "The miracle of micro…nance? Evidence from a randomized evaluation" (http://bit.ly/b7A0kI) Worth a read.
The great problem with microfinance is one of expectations. It is tauted as that which will solve the problems of poverty and the factual evidence shows the results are at best mixed. My favorite analogy that I use when asked about microfinance by people in the US is to pose a question: "Would you rather have a job that will pay you a guaranteed salary every two weeks in exchange for your labor, or a credit card with a maximum balance of $10,000?"
They realize it is a false choice as most Americans have both, but when they see that microfinance for the poor is simply leaving them with the latter without the former they begin to understand how it can potentially drive people further into poverty, not out of it. Furthermore, they also get the idea that employment is arguably what truly helps people permanently leave poverty, not credit to start small stores, roadside dhabas, or add one buffalo to the family's herd (all enterprises that require some scale to see significant return on assets).
Chris
Some comments:
I think examining the repayment rate would be worth looking into. I suspect that often other women cover for those that are short, so the repayment rate within the women's group is much lower than the 99% reported. And who knows what kind of interest rates are charged in that case.
Also, what are the comparable interest rates on informal lending from a local money lender. Apparently these can be much higher. Also, can these money-lenders coexist with microcredit? If so, then microcredit is clearly not fulfilling all the credit demand/fulfilling different credit needs.
The 24% seems bad as an annual rate, but when I was working with microcredit in Senegal, many loans were simply working capital and not long term fixed investments. Women would take loans to buy a hundred watermelons which would then be sold at the market that week. So this capital could be rolled over several times in a month potentially, etc.
Also, is it that bad that loans are used for consumption? It makes a debt trap more likely, but that it true of any consumer credit. Do we think that the poor should have no access to consumer credit? Naturally this dampens microcredit's effect on poverty, but it's still a position that needs to be defended.
Also, is microcredit popular because it works, or because it's convenient politically? Essentially microcredit is supported by both left and right (and most enthusiastically by economists). For the left, it allows empowerment of the poor and the human dignity that comes from running your own business. For the right, it's a market-based solution that requires little public funds that allows the poor to "pull themselves up by their bootstraps." Political expedience isn't a fatal flaw, but it means that microcredit will enjoy broader support that a more controversial program that may be more effective.
And what is the maximum payoff to microcredit? Let's posit an extreme case where interest rates are zero and everyone in a developing country has access to microcredit. What is the upper limit on poverty reduction? Micro-interventions are essential, but the benefits will eventually be tapped out and growth will need to be the main driver of poverty alleviation.
please feel free to correct me
The major problems and challenges as I understand it, seem to be the following ..
1) Isn't hard good quality pan-India data on the performance and other parameters on the micro-finance experience in India, generally considered to be more or less absent ? If this is the case this would be the first major hurdle in any analysis of it and conversely any strategy thereby adopted. In India this would particularly be the case given the sheer scale of economic and social heterogeneity. The mass suicides of AP farmers resulting from a vicious debt trap was concentrated in the dry semi-arid 'Telengana' region of AP and at the same time as fairly good economic growth (rather than suicides) in coastal AP. AP's new agricultural policy meant completely different things for two different regions within it. I offer this as an example of heterogeneity, in this case coming into conflict with a uniform 'solution'. In the context of MF, one would imagine during this period that the two regions would show different motivations and perhaps risk behaviour (when averaged out) when it came to loans sought from MFIs. The point being, imagine trying to gauge the effectiveness of any economic, organisational model across say the EU without any hard data ? Hard, good quality data is a priority need in MF today in India. Wouldn't you agree ?
2)The high interest rate.
Often the defence is that this is a lot lower than what the village money lender charges (anyone in the village with a stable income) which is often as high and higher than 70% (from what i have heard) but when pressed the MFI's will grant that its indeed high. But isn't this quite a fundamental problem ? Isn't this a lets-go-back-to-the-blackboard kind of a conceptual problem ? Is it true to say that MF would need a wholly different kind of a business model, than the ones in evidence at present, that would make it possible to disperse enough volumes of really small loans, with the infrastructure needed to expand the network to the borrowers doorstep, Without needing to charge him a high interest rate ? Isn't the problem of the high interest rate essentially a conceptual, fundamental, 'non-trivial' problem ?
3) Its micro-credit not micro-finance.
This is the third problem, right ? They can right now , only take loans. there isn't a way yet for the village poor in India to save. Any talk of poverty alleviation, even when looking at an involved issue such as poverty from the sole narrow lens of financial services, without a mechanism for the poor to save money, seems a bit naive to me.
There are ofcourse several others which I understand, fit loosely into the above three major ones – like establishing credit history and basic financial education like knowing the difference between simple and compound interest.
In this context, it would be very interesting to work out the full potential that the Universal Identification (UID) Scheme holds in terms of a basic infrastructural building block.
Also, what about urban microfinance ? Shouldn't small interest rates be a lot easier to achieve when serving a city's poor ? But could a new challenge then become the repayment rate in an urban setting ? Don't we know city slums, to have a strong, robust social fabric where peer-pressure might work and hence therefore not threaten the repayment rate ?
(Contd below)
(Contd from above)
The comment I have to make is the following – It seems to me the case that MF in India is essentially at a very nascent stage. Its often easy to mis-ennumerate the layers of poverty that exists here and often within a single village. A small land holdings farmer is by no means well-to-do and is most-definetely poor but in comparison to a farm labourer for example (to say nothing of the dalits and other socially marginalised groups or others who belong to the village's service sector and certainly never mind the adivasis), has critical assets. The small shop owner in a village, within the eco-system of a village is by no means poor. The micro finance loans that seem to work in India, in that its not being used for consumption alone, seem to be the upper-middle crust in a typical village. I'd like to be proved wrong in this, but from what i understand, this seems to be the case.
It seems to me, particularly because of the high interest rate problem, that the MFI as a business entity will find itself severly limited in providing the kind of services it aspires to.
It might be necessary to take a hand-holding approach – divorce the MFI exercise from the profit motive until such time as more mature markets evolve that can operate in free market paradigm.
I'd like to know what you think about this.
And finally, MF , even at its most effective, is but one element in poverty alleviation. Those who see it as a golden key to erradicate poverty, haven't fully appreciated the convergence of the factors and circumstances that come to keep a people poor and on the margins. And its the over-simplification of issues that most readily frustrate poverty reduction efforts.
did u read the recent spread in the times on SKS raising equity? quite a decent feature i felt.
besides.. i dont understand the conclusion on the poor being risk takers. i certainly disagree with any psychological argument that argues such. However, the experience with microfinance has been strange in some parts of AP and TN. Institutional factors play a huge role in determinig risk behavior.
I think the cost of the lottery for the individual is very relevant. I have not come across any study that asks people to set their own price for a lottery. Maybe if a poor person sets a price whose loss will ahve a higher marginal disutility when compared to say me, i will take the behavioral experiment to yield a result that clearly shows a poor peson is a high risk taker.
social prevelance of gambling amongst the poor is something i cannot understand fully though.
in the end… like always… i dont clearly understand what i set out to sy….. sigh..
also… it is wrong to think a NBFC mfi is out there to help. an mfi that has raised equity/debt has to necessarily look for a palatable ROI. It plain finance, its business. tehre is a clear business paradigm.
a NGO mfi is completely different thing in its operations and costs and interest rates. there is clear social benifit paradigm.
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/debate-shouldmicrofinance-institution-be-for-profit-_474471-0.html
03 Aug 2010